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NOTES AND COMMENT
k. NEW YORK JUDGMENT FOR ACCRUED ALIMONY-IS NOTICE
REQUIRED FOR DUE PROCESS?
From ; reluctant and embittered spouse, the collection of alimony
often poses a difficult problem.1 In New York, the aim of our pro-
cedure is to assure promptness of payment to a wife who is dependent
upon alimony, lest she become a public charge. The New York State
Legislature, cognizant of her difficult position, has provided three
basic methods for the collection of the decreed alimony.
One method commonly used, though it is one which usually adds
further animosity to already strained relations, is contempt.2 A sec-
ond method is sequestration and the appointment of a receiver.3 Both
the contempt and the sequestration proceedings may be based upon
the original judgment or decree which directs the paymert of alimony.
The use of the latter, however, is limited to cases where there is prop-
erty of the debtor within the state, and he cannot be served personally.
The third method for the collection of alimony, and the one which
will occupy our interest in this note, is execution. 4 It was recognized
and firmly established at an early date in the case of Miller v. Miller
where the practice of issuing execution on the original judgment de-
creeing alimony, was sanctioned. There the court reasoned that: "No
difficulty exists in the way of docketing such a judgment, nor in issu-
ing execution upon it, from time to time, as the amounts recovered
become due and payable." " With the case of Thayer v. ThayerG
which is recognized as the leading authority on this general phase of
New York law, there was a change in view. The court there recog-
nized a practical difficulty in the issuance of execution on the original
judgment and made an attempt to circumvent it by requiring an order
of the court to the clerk to docket as a new judgment the unpaid
installments of alimony. This new procedure was designed to obviate
any confusion with respect to the actual amount for which execution
could be obtained. However, the court felt that this new docketing
was purely a ministerial act, and that notice was not required on the
"'That many husbands object to paying alimony can be fairly deduced
from the number and variety of statutes providing for methods of enforcing
the court's decree." Vernier and Hurlbut, The Historical Background of
Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure (1939) 6 LAwN AND
CoNTEmp. PRoB. 197, 204.
2 N. Y. Civ. PRA. Acr § 1172.
s N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § l171-a.
4 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 504.
5 Miller v. Miller, 7 Hun 208, 209 (N. Y. 1876).6 145 App. Div. 268, 129 N. Y. Supp. 1035 (1st Dep't 1911).
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application to docket since this act was part of the original action.
"Such an order is not the rendition of a new judgment for the amount,
but merely a means of putting into practical effect the plaintiff's right
to have her judgment put in such form that execution can be issued
upon it." 7
In 1939 the New York legislature enacted into statute form 8 the
procedure which had been in use since the decision in the Thayer case.
But this statute did not substantially alter the earlier practice. It
"was designed to eliminate the burden of plenary or protracted litiga-
tion to enforce the wife's established rights under a matrimonial de-
cree. It was intended to afford summary relief to the wife upon the
non-payment of the alimony." 9
In line with the trend of retaining jurisdiction evidenced by the
Thayer case, final judgments decreeing alimony for many years, by
statute in New York,1 have been subject to modification for good
cause shown upon the motion of either party in the discretion of the
court. That statutory qualification has been interpreted by the Court
of Appeals to authorize the retention of jurisdiction for the purpose
of providing for the maintenance of the wife and children. "The
jurisdiction of the court over the parties and over the incidental
subject-matter is prolonged; and to that extent the action may be
said to be pending within the meaning and intent of Section 1169 of
the Civil Practice Act." 11 From this authority it would seem that
for the purpose of enforcement, the personal jurisdiction upon which
the original decree was based, subsists.
The New York procedure for the collectioi of alimony was re-
cently the subject of a decision in the United States Supreme Court.
In the case of Griffin v. Griffin 12 (Rutledge, Black, Frankfurter, JJ.,
dissenting), it was held that a New York judgment for accrued ali-
mony, which had been entered in 1938 under the procedure set down
7Id. at 270.
8 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1171-b, L. 1939, c. 431, Amend. L. 1940, c. 226.
"Where the husband, in an action for divorce, . . . , makes default in paying
any sum of money as required by the judgment or order directing the payment
thereof, the court may make an order directing the entry of judgment for the
amount of such arrears, .... The application . . . shall be upon such notice
. . . as the court may direct. Such judgment may be enforced by execution
or in any other manner provided by law for the collection of money
judgments. .. ."
9 McCanliss v. McCanliss, 268 App. Div. 138, 141, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 289
(2d Dep't 1944).
10 N. Y. Cxv. PAc. AcT § 1170, L. 1921, c. 199; L. 1925, c. 240; L. 1934,
c. 521; formerly C. C. P. § 1771, L. 1895, c. 891. ". . . The court, by order,
upon the application of either party to the action, . . . at any time after final
judgment, may annul, vary or modify such directions, . . . for the custody,
. . . and maintenance of any such child or children or for the support of the
plaintiff idt such final judgment or order or orders."
"Fox v. Fox, 263 N. Y. 68, 70, 188 N. E. 160, 161 (1933); Hoops v.
Hoops, 292 N. Y. 428, 55 N. E. (2d) 488 (1944).
12327 U. S. 220, 90 L. ed. 534 (1946).
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by the Thayer case, was void for want of due process because it was
entered without notice to the defendant. In deciding an appeal from
an order of the District Court of the District of Columbia granting a
motion for summary judgment based upon the New York judgment,
the court had to construe Section 1170 of the Civil Practice Act, as
interpreted by the New York courts, and the procedure provided by
the Thayer case. The decision reached goes beyond any prior case
in the field of due process.
II
The unquestioned keystone in the constitutional structure, which
safeguards individual rights, is the requirement of due process. In-
herent in this doctrine is the necessity for jurisdiction before a court
may presume to adjudicate the personal or property rights of any
person. The essential minimum factor universally required for juris-
diction is notice. For it has been variously held that other factors
might be dispensed with so long as some procedure is followed which
is reasonably calculated to give notice to the defendant that his per-
sonal or property rights are the subject of a judicial proceeding.
In the case of a proceeding in personam, personal service of
process is the rule, though in recent years other factors, such as resi-
dence, doing business, or use of the state highways, have displaced
personal service as the exclusive method of obtaining jurisdiction for
the purpose of issuing a personal judgment. But even in the last-
mentioned cases, sone procedure for giving notice is required. Jus-
tice Rutledge, in his dissenting opinion in the Griffin case, points out,
however, that this notice is "notice in the jurisdictional sense contem-
plated by the Pennoyer v. Neff line of decisions." (Italics supplied.) 13
We will infer for the purpose of this discussion, dealing with the
collection of alimony judgments, that personal jurisdiction was origi-
nally acquired. When a court has properly acquired this jurisdiction
and a party has had full and complete opportunity to defend on the
merits, is notice of each subsequent step in the litigation required in
order to satisfy due process? In the past, the cases held that it is
not.1 4 In addition, it was felt that the actual procedure to be fol-
lowed subsequent to obtaining jurisdiction is a matter for the indi-
vidual state to determine.15
13Id. at 238.
14 .. . the established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require
that a defendant ... should, after a judgment has been rendered against him,
have a further notice and hearing before supplemental proceedings are taken
to reach his property in satisfaction of the judgment." Sanford, J., writing
for the Court in Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U. S.
285, 288, 69 L. ed. 288, 292 (1924).
15 "Whether judgments shall be paid in a lump sum or by instalments and
in either event whether execution shall issue and be levied by one form of
procedure or another, with or without further notice, are matters wholly of
policy within state power to determine, raising no question of constitutional
import." Rutledge, J., dissenting in Griffin v. Griffn, supra note 12, at 241.
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When we look to the procedure provided by New York statute
and decisions 16 it would seem clear that this state regards the new
judgment for accrued alimony as a part of the original action, and as
a method of enforcing its original decree. Although, admittedly the
better procedure might be to give notice at every vital stage of a
judicial proceeding, notice need only be given once in order to satisfy
the demands of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. It is submitted that the notice given in the
original action was sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
for due process.
III
But in the Griffin case the court held that the 1938 New York
judgment for accrued alimony was void, because "there is an assertion
of power in the court to enter a money judgment and issue execution
upon it without notice." 17 Thus "there was a want of judicial due
process, and hence want of that jurisdiction over the person of peti-
tioner prerequisite to the rendition of a judgment in personam against
him." 18 It is evident from the decision that the court believed the
act of docketing that judgment to be a separate and distinct proceed-
ing from the action which preceded it; such belief is not in accord
with the view taken by the New York courts.
However, it is believed that the Supreme Court would not have
taken that stand had it not been for the view it took of the right given
to the debtor by Section 1170 of the Civil Practice Act to apply for
alteration of the alimony decree because of inability to pay. Chief
Justice Stone thought that this was a substantial right which was
being summarily foreclosed by the procedure followed in this case.
Let us examine that right.
Section 1170 provides that a court may modify, alter, or annul
any direction in a judgment, or order, providing for alimony upon
the application of either party.' 9 It is important to note here that
the directions in the original judgment and the installments accruing
under those directions are two different things. Today the law in
New York is settled that the directions in the judgment may be modi-
fied.20  What is the law with respect to accrued installments? The
Supreme Court believed that the New York procedure under this
section provided for modification nunc pro tunc as to previously ac-
crued installments. The section itself does not mention the words
nunc pro tunc 21 and until recently it was not questioned that this
merely authorized modifications as to future installments. Judge
16 See notes 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 supra.
17 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 231, 90 L. ed. 534, 540 (1946).
18 Id. at 228.
19 See note 10 supra.
20 Hoops v. Hoops, 292 N. Y. 428, 55 N. E. (2d) 488 (1944).
21 See note 10 supra.
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Stone cited three New York cases, Van Dusen v. Van Dusen, Cun-
ningham v. Cunningham and Eisinger v. Eisinger,2 which are said to
hold that as to already-accrued installments the power to annul or
modify exists when a change of circumstances is shown. Unfortu-
nately, these cases are only published as memoranda. The Cunning-
ham case cites no authority and the Eisinger case cites the Van Dusen
case. The Van Dusen, case, which is the earliest, gives as its author-
ity, the cases of Kirkbride v. Van Note and Karlin v. Karlin.23  How-
ever, neither of these stands for the proposition that a husband has
the right to show "that circumstances have so changed as to justify a
reduction of alimony already accrued." 24
In the Kirkbride case, it was held that Section 1159 of the Civil
Practice Act,2 5 which provides for the modification of an alimony
decree where the wife remarries, is mandatory as a matter of public
policy. Pursuant to that statute, the right of the wife to alimony, and
the need therefor, ceases upon her remarriage. And at any time
thereafter, the husband may have the provisions which direct pay-
ment, stricken from the decree. It would seem clear that in such a
case no alimony will accrue from the date of the wife's remarriage,
whether or not the judgment is physically modified: This case, there-
fore, does not assert the power to alter the obligation of the husband
to pay any installments which have accrzwd.
The Karlin case dealt with a situation where the parties of their
own accord agreed in writing to a settlement different from that set
forth in the decree of divorce. The wife, in fact, waived her right to
any future installments so that none ever accrued. The lower court
was only enforcing the valid agreement of the parties when it modified
the decree nunc pro tune as of the date of the agreement. And in
the case of Cunningham v. Cunningham,2 6 the original decree pro-
vided for alimony for the wife, and payments for the maintenance of
two minor children. The modification sanctioned was with respect
to the payments for the maintenance of the children subsequent to
their attaining majority. Properly speaking, therefore, in those cases
the alteration did not concern accrued alimony. It appears that there
is a dearth of. authority in New York holding that accrued installments
are subject to modification nun.c pro tunc.
22 Van Dusen v. Van Dusen, 258 App. Div. 1020, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 96 (3d
Dep't 1940); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 261 App. Div. 973, 25 N. Y. S.(2d) 933 (2d Dep't 1941); Eisinger v. Eisinger, 261 App. Div. 1031, 26
N. Y. S. (2d) 22 (3d Dep't 1941).23 Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N. Y. 244, 9 N. E. (2d) 852 (1937) ; Karlin
v. Karlin, 280 N. Y. 32, 19 N. E. (2d) 669 (1939).
24 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 227, 90 L. ed. 534, 537 (1946).
25 Since renumbered § 1172-c, L. 1940, c. 226 (first sentence).
28261 App. Div. 973, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 933 (2d Dep't 1941).
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IV
On the other hand there is long and respected line of authority
in New York to the effect that accrued but unpaid installments of
alimony are vested rights which are not subject to modification even
by the legislature.27  The character of alimony in New York was
exhaustively treated in Sistare v. Sistare, where the United States
Supreme Court found, in the then existing statutes, no "power to
revoke or modify an installment of alimony which had accrued prior
to the making of an application to vary or modify" the original judg-
ment.28  The Sistare case cited Livingston v. LivingstoA,29 which is
the basic case in New York regarding the character of alimony. Oddly
this case was not cited in Griffin v. Griffin, although it is still respected
as authority by the Court of Appeals.30 And in the Karlin case,
supra, which the Supreme Court does cite, Judge Loughran made
clear that it was not intended to overrule Livingston v. Livingston. 1
Since the Sistare case, Section 1170 has been amended several times.3 2
However, the amendments do not give the court power to modify
with respect to accrued installments (as the Griffin case holds the
1925 amendment did), z3 either expressly or by implication, as con-
strued by the New York courts.3 4  The rule in New York, as laid
down by the cases, is that the original decree, if granted subject to
Section 1170 of the Civil Practice Act, is subject to the power of the
court to strike out or modify any provisions which direct the payment
of alimony as to future installments.3 5 However, the courts have
steadfastly held that already accrued alimony under such provisions
cannot be touched.36
27 "These past due sums have become vested rights of property in the plain-
tiff .... ." Harris v. Harris, 259 N. Y. 334, 337, 183 N. E. 7, 8 (1932);
Parkinson v. Parkinson, 222 App. Div. 838, 226 N. Y. Supp. 454 (2d Dep't
1928) ; Krauss v. Krauss, 127 App. Div. 740, 111 N. Y. Supp. 788 (1st Dep't
1908).
28 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 22, 54 L. ed. 905 (1910).29 Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123 (1903).
3 Moufang v. State of New York, 295 N. Y. 121, 65 N. E. (2d) 321
(1946); Waddey v. Waddey, 290 N. Y. 251, 49 N. E. (2d) 8 (1943).
31 "Lizingston; v. Livingston (ubi supra) holds nothing to the contrary,"
Karlin v. Karlin, 280 N. Y. 32, 36, 19 N. E. (2d) 669, 670 (1939).
32 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1170, L. 1921, c. 199; L. 1925, c. 240; L. 1934,
c. 521; formerly C. C. P. § 1771, L. 1895, c. 891.
33 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 226, 90 L. ed. 534, 536 (1946).
34 "Installments of alimony thus awarded by a final judgment create vested
rights which the court has no power to nullify." Treherne-Thomas v.
Treherne-Thomas, 267 App. Div. 509, 512, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 679, 682 (1st
Dep't 1944).
35 See notes 10 and 11 supra.
36 See notes 27 and 34 supra; Wiseman v. Wiseman, 172 Misc. 114, 14
N. Y. S. (2d) 521 (1939); McPartland v. McPartland, 146 Misc. 672, 261
N. Y. Supp. 844 (1932).
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The latest Court of Appeals case concerning the subject of modi-
fication nunr pro tunc is Waddey v. WaddeyY' There the court
dealt with the application of Section 1172-c of the Civil Practice
Act,38 which provides for modification because of the wife's mis-
conduct, and its retrospective effect upon decrees granted prior to its
enactment. The court held that as to the provisions directing the
payment of alimony, the statute had no retrospective effect in spite of
the fact that the decree was granted originally subject to Section 1170,
as it was in the Griffin case. In a dissent which claimed that the
statute could operate as to decrees entered prior to its enactment with-
out being unconstitutional, Judge Desmond recognized that accrued
installments, however, could not be touched, when he said, "the ali-
mony payments forfeited were those which were to come due in the
future." 3
From this it follows that in New York the right granted to a
husband by Section 1170 of the Civil Practice Act to show changed
circumstances and an inability to pay applies to prospective install-
ments only. Any modification of already accrued installments would
be held as unconstitutional in view of the consistent position taken by
the Court of Appeals. It is submitted that the husband does not
have a right to have accrued installments modified or annulled nunc
pro tunc.
Although the court in the Griffin case based its decision princi-
pally upon the supposed right of the husband to have accrued install-
ments modified nunc pro tunc, passing reference was made to his right
to show payment. The majority thought that this right also was cut
off by the new judgment, though the discussion on this point was
inadequate.
When an application is made by the wife for an order to the clerk
to docket the new judgment it is necessary for her to allege non-
payment. In the event that payment has in fact been made, it is
difficult to imagine any case when the wife could consciously claim
non-payment in order to obtain the judgment, or, having obtained
the judgment, assert it in another state without there being actual
fraud on her part. This is considered to be a fraud on the court
which renders the judgment void.40 The determination of that fact,
moreover, is not limited to the state of issuance, but even the courts
37 Waddey v. Waddey, 290 N. Y. 251, 49 N. E. (2d) 8 (1943).38 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1172-c. Modification of judgment or order in
action for divorce or annulment. ".... The court in its discretion upon appli-
cation of the husband on notice, upon proof that the wife is habitually living
with another man and holding herself out as his wife, ... may modify such
final judgment and any orders made with respect thereto by annulling the
provisions of such final judgment ...directing payment of money for the
support of such wife."39 Waddey v. Waddey, 290 N. Y. 251, 260, 49 N. E. (2d) 8, 13 (1943).
40 Stevens v. Central Natl. Bank, 144 N. Y. 50, 39 N. E. 68 (1894); Van
Cortlandt v. Underhill, 17 Johns. 405 (N. Y. 1819).
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in other states where the new judgment is sought to be asserted can
determine the question without violating the full faith and credit
clause.41  It would seem that the husband does not lose the benefit
of his payment when the judgment is entered because he may there-
after assert her fraud, with his payment as its basis, to defeat any
proceeding on the new judgment in any other state.
Unquestionably notice of some sort, not necessarily personal,
should be given in the interest of fair play, as the New York statute
does provide. However, it is once more submitted that the husband
is not being deprived of any right and that notice is not required in
this proceeding to acquire jurisdiction or satisfy due process.
What other defenses can the husband raise when an attempt is
made to collect alimony? It is said that he may defend on the
grounds of death, remarriage, misconduct, or waiver.42  On the basis
of the New York decisions it would seem that no alimony vests sub-
sequent to remarriage, misconduct, or waiver.43  There is no con-
troversy concerning death since both the obligation to pay and the
right to receive alimony cease at the death of either party.
From the above we may conclude that the entry of this judgment
does not foreclose any defenses either for domestic or full faith and
credit purposes.
44
V
Since the debtor does not lose any defenses when a judgment is
docketed pursuant to the procedure of the Thayer case or Section
1171-b, does its docketing substantially affect his rights in any other
way so as to create the need for notice? The New York courts hold
that he does not lose any substantial right when the new judgment is
entered. 45  In fact, from the time of the Thayer case this docketing
has been regarded as merely a ministerial act. When an original
judgment decreeing the payment of alimony is entered, the obligation
to pay is crystalizdd into an installment status. As each month rolls
around, an installment becomes due. This the husband knows with-
out any reminder; he also knows that if he is unable to pay he may
41 Davis v. Cornue, 151 N. Y. 172, 45 N. E. 449 (1896); Rutledge, J.,
dissenting in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 243, 90 L. ed. 534, 547 (1946) ;
Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 249, 90 L. ed.
534, 549 (1946).
42 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 227, 90 L. ed. 534, 537 (1946).
43 Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N. Y. 244, 9 N. E. (2d) 852 (1937) (re-
marriage); Waddey v. Waddey, 290 N. Y. 251, 49 N. E. (2d) 8 (1943)
(misconduct); Karlin v. Karlin, 280 N. Y. 32, 19 N. E. (2d) 669 (1939)(waiver).
44 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 905 (1910).
45 "It added nothing to the defendant's burden, and did not amount to a
new judgment against him. Nor did it give the plaintiff any remedy to which
she was not already entitled. It simply removed the technical difficulties
which seemed to stand in the way of the exercise of her undoubted right to
enforce payment of the alimony by execution." Thayer v. Thayer, 145 App.
Div. 268, 270, 129 N. Y. Supp. 105, 1036-7 (1st Dep't 1911).
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apply to have the directions as to future installments modified. It
stands to reason that he should be alert to assert his cause for his own
protection. This burden of vigilance is no more onerous than any
other in life.
It is well to note that the right given to the husband to apply for
modification under Section 1170, and the right given to the wife to
docket her judgment by Section 1171-b, are mutually independent.
Neither mentions the other, nor has any case in New York ever held
that one depended upon the other. The right of the wife to docket
is not subject to any right of the husband to modify, as the Griffin
case appears to hold. "Although section 1171-b provides that the
court 'may' make an order directing the entry of judgment for the
amount of any arrears ... it was not intended that discretion should
reside in the court to refuse a money judgment for alimony due and
unpaid after a final decree. Installments of alimony thus awarded
by a final judgment create vested rights which the court has no power
to nullify. (Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377; Harris v.
Harris, 259 N. Y. 334.)" 46
If no new rights are created in the wife, nor any right of the
husband taken away by this proceeding, which has been construed by
the New York courts to be a part of the original action, it is difficult
to see where there was a federal question for the Supreme Court to
decide, or how there was any violation of the due process requirement
of notice.
In 1938, the New York procedure, following the Thayer case,
provided that the new judgment could be docketed ex part. 47 There-
fore the judgment in the Griffin case should have been held valid.
But what as to judgments docketed under Section 1171-b (since
1939) ? The statute provides that the application shall be "upon
such notice to the husband as the court may direct." Certainly we
can imagine situations in which notice would be less than useless, no
matter how given. Considering the reason for the procedure, 48 its
nature,49 and the wording of the statute, it is submitted that the judge
should be permitted to dispense with notice in his discretion. It
would be constitutional unless we are to extend the requirements of
due process as set forth by Pennoyer v. Neff 50 beyond any point
heretofore reached.
HARRY J. DONAGHY, JR.,
EDWARD A. GRuPP.
46Treherne-Thomas v. Treherne-Thomas, 267 App. Div. 509, 512, 46
N. Y. S. (2d) 679, 682 (1st Dep't 1944).
47 The New York judgment in the Griffin case was entered before the
enactment of § 1171-b N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act.
48 McCanliss v. McCanliss, 268 App. Div. 138, 141, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 289,
292 (2d Dep't 1944).
49 See notes 9 and 45 supra; Wiseman v. Wiseman, 172 Misc. 114, 14
N. Y. S. (2d) 521 (Sup. Ct 1939).
50 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
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